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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the optimal man-
agement of two ecologically interdependent, competing
species, roe deer (Capreolus capreolus) and fallow deer
(Dama dama). To this end, we develop a numerical stage-
structured model, accounting for species-speciﬁc life his-
tory characteristics, gender, and stage-speciﬁc hunting val-
ues. Two contrasting management regimes are considered:
optimal joint management of the two species and manage-
ment where the decision maker is ignorant about interspe-
ciﬁc competition. Results from our case study show that
the presence of interspeciﬁc competition reduces roe deer
population size and harvest by 30% and 47%, respectively,
and reduces the net present value by 9%. High interspeciﬁc
competition could lead to the exclusion of the roe deer from
the area. In contrast, ignorance about the level and conse-
quences of interspeciﬁc competition has no impact on har-
vest decisions and revenues. The explanation is the higher
hunting beneﬁts for fallow deer.
Summary for Managers
• Wildlife managers need bioeconomic models for deci-
sions on ecologically interdependent species.
• This study investigates optimal joint management of roe
and fallow deer when the fallow deer exerts a negative
impact on roe deer due to interspeciﬁc competition.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
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• Results show that interspeciﬁc competition reduces the
net present value of hunting at the study site by 9%.
• Regulations will not increase the net present value of
hunting in a situation where the manager is ignorant of
interspeciﬁc competition.
KEYWORD S
bioeconomic modeling, fallow deer, hunting, interspeciﬁc competition,
roe deer, stage-structured model
1 INTRODUCTION
Game species, especially large grazers, provide society a wide range of beneﬁts such as meat, recre-
ational hunting, aesthetic values, and maintenance of ecosystem balance (Chardonnet et al., 2002).
The provision of beneﬁts can be aﬀected by the fact that large herbivores compete for resources such
as food and space (Birch, 1957; Caughley & Sinclair, 1994). When species are interdependent, human
activities that aﬀect one species will also have an impact on the other species. If the management of
a single species ignores indirect eﬀects on other species, this can give rise to economic losses due to
the reductions in the values generated by other wildlife. Hence, there is a need for management strate-
gies that account for the synergies and trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent beneﬁts and costs generated by the
species. In addition, the value of many large game species, in terms of meat and trophies, is strongly
dependent on the age and the sex of the individual animal, implying that consideration of the age and
sex composition of the populations and harvest matters for the value generated.
There is limited knowledge about implications of interspeciﬁc interactions for the economically
optimal management of wildlife. In our context, there are two strands of pertinent economic litera-
ture: studies on the management of large herbivores and studies on the management of interacting,
competing species.
Economic studies on the management of large herbivores are usually applied to a single species, and
use age- or stage-structured models (Collier & Krementz, 2007; Olaussen & Mysterud, 2012; Olaussen
& Skonhoft, 2011; Skonhoft et al., 2013; Xu & Boyce, 2010). In addition to those, there are a couple of
studies investigating interdependences between a large semidomesticated grazer, the reindeer, and its
main winter food resource, lichen. Among those, Virtala (1992, 1996) and Moxnes, Danell, Gaare, and
Kumpula (2001) are based on biomass models, whereas Tahvonen, Kumpula, and Pekkarinen (2014)
apply age-structured modeling. The outcome diﬀers considerably depending on the use of biomass or
age-structured models (Tahvonen et al., 2014) and an obvious advantage of age-structured models is
that they account for species life history.
Studies accounting for species competition are mostly found in ﬁshery economics (Chaudhuri, 1986,
1987; Conrad & Adu-Asamoah, 1986; Finnoﬀ & Tschirhart, 2003; Flaaten, 1988, 1991; Hannesson,
1983). These studies typically use a biomass approach, hence abstracting from the role of species’ life
history. Exceptions include Hamre (2003) and Nieminen, Lindroos, and Heikinheimo (2012, 2016),
which consider multilateral interactions between one predator and two prey ﬁsh species within an age-
structured modeling framework.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the beneﬁts and costs to hunters from two competing species,
the roe deer (Capreolus capreolus) and the fallow deer (Dama dama). The roe deer is the second most
valuable hunted deer species in Sweden (Mattsson, Boman, & Ericsson, 2008), while the fallow deer
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in recent years has been suggested to be introduced in additional locations, motivated, for example,
by its hunting value as well as the grazing pattern, which helps maintaining an open landscape. The
ecological literature suggest that the presence of fallow deer exerts negative eﬀects on the foraging
behavior of roe deer, but not vice versa (Focardi, Aragno, Montanaro, & Riga, 2006), implying that
there is a unilateral, negative impact of the fallow deer on the roe deer in terms of the competition
for food (Nichols, A˚kesson, & Kjellander, 2016). This can have diﬀerent economic implications,
depending on the management regime. Two diﬀerent regimes are therefore considered in the paper,
one where the species are optimally and jointly managed, and one where the decision maker is
ignorant about interspeciﬁc competition. We further explore the possibilities to introduce an eﬃcient
economic incentive, in terms of a tax on fallow deer populations, to ensure that the socially optimal
outcome is achieved when decisions on the two species are taken by a manager who is ignorant about
the negative impact of fallow deer on roe deer. As mentioned previously, age and gender of game is
of major importance for the hunting value, which is also true for large grazers (Naevdal, Olaussen, &
Skonhoft, 2012), motivating the use of a stage-structured model.
Our study contributes to the literature through the use of a stage-structured numerical model of
interspeciﬁc competition. We have only found a few earlier studies using this approach, Hamre (2003)
and Nieminen et al. (2012, 2016), applied to ﬁshery. Further, we add to the literature on economically
optimal management of competing species through the investigation of the potential of using eﬃcient
economic instruments when managers are unaware of species interdependences.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the magnitude of interspeciﬁc competition has modest eﬀects on the eco-
nomic returns to hunters, but signiﬁcant importance for roe deer populations. In contrast, managers’
knowledge about interspeciﬁc competition has minor eﬀects on hunting revenues generated by the
species. The marginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer is 177 SEK per unit of fallow deer,1 but
introduction of a tax on fallow deer would not improve on hunting revenues in a situation where the
manager is ignorant about the impact of fallow deer on roe deer.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the interactions between roe and fallow deer are
described. Section 3 presents the joint population model and Section 4 describes the bioeconomic
model. A description of the data used in the simulations is available in Section 5 and results are pre-
sented in Section 6. Section 7 includes a discussion and conclusions.
2 ROE DEER AND FALLOW DEER
Fallow deer is an exotic species in Sweden: it was introduced in the 1570s as a new game species
(Carlström & Nyman, 2005). Since the late 1900s, the fallow deer population has increased substan-
tially and it is currently present in several locations in the country even though the dispersal is slow.
The fallow deer is a relatively large grazer, an adult weighs 45 to 120 kg. It is usually described as a
gregarious species and it has a high tolerance for high animal densities (Carlström & Nyman, 2005).
In contrast, roe deer is native to Sweden and found throughout most parts of the country (Cederlund
& Liberg, 1995). It is a relatively small and solitary species: adult individuals weigh 20 to 30 kg, and
population densities are generally lower than for fallow deer.
In areas of Sweden where the fallow deer currently exists in higher densities, people have expressed
concerns about decreasing roe deer populations. Evidence from the literature suggests that the fal-
low deer often displaces the roe deer from feeding sites and from areas with high fallow population
density (Ferretti, Bertoldi, Sforzi and Fattorini, 2011; Ferretti, Sforzi, & Lovari, 2008). Using a ﬁeld
experiment, Ferretti et al. (2008) show that encounters between fallow deer and roe deer led to the dis-
placement of roe deer in 83% of the studied cases. As much as 94% of the displacement events occurred
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F IGURE 1 Stage-structured life cycle graph for roe and fallow deer
while the roe deer was feeding, implying that roe deer are interrupted and regularly abandon feeding
site when living in sympatry with fallow deer. Even when fallow deer showed no sign of aggression,
roe deer moves away in 72% of the encounters. This suggests that a high fallow deer density leads to
reduced food access in roe deer, due to feeding displacement (Ferretti et al., 2008).
Roe deer as a selective feeder, prefers high quality forage such as easily digestible herbs and leaves, in
contrast to fallow deer as a more grazing generalist herbivore (Hofmann 1989) adapted to a mixed diet,
hence accommodated to a broad spectrum of plants, including grass, leaves, and bark (Alm, Birgersson,
& Leimar, 2001; Ferretti et al., 2008; Nichols et al., 2016). In a joint habitat, fallow deer also eats the
high quality plants preferred by roe deer, thereby reducing the habitat's carrying capacity for roe deer.
Together, the empirical evidence thus suggests that there is a negative and largely unidirectional eﬀect
of the fallow deer on the roe deer.
3 JOINT DEER POPULATION MODEL
To account for the interdependences between the two species, we develop a stage-structured population
model, where a single decision maker seeks to maximize the net present beneﬁts from the management
of the two species on a given plot of land. We classify the life cycle of both species into four main
stages: fawn, juvenile, adult, and senescent, based on species speciﬁc life history. Classiﬁcation into
life stages (age classes) allows us to account for nonlinear variations in reproduction, survival, and
hunting value over age. Thus, in our stage classiﬁcation, the roe population is structured as follows
for both sexes: fawn (year < 1), juvenile (1 ≤ years < 3), adult (3 ≤ years < 8), and senescence (8 ≤
years < 12). The male fallow deer population is structured as fawn (year < 1), juvenile (1 ≤ years < 3),
adult (3 ≤ years < 5), and senescence (5 ≤ years < 13), whereas the female fallow deer population is
structured as fawn (year < 1), juvenile (1 ≤ years < 3), adult (3 ≤ years < 12), and senescence (12 ≤
years < 21). Notice that the stage duration diﬀers due to species- and sex-speciﬁc diﬀerences in life
span, physiological growth rate, reproductive maturation, and trophy size.
Using a four-stage structured projection matrix, see Figure 1, we show the population transition
across stages with individuals in Stages 2 to 4 contributing to recruitment in Stage 1 via reproduction
(𝑀𝑖). Since the duration of Stages 2 to 4 does not vary directly with time moving from year t to t + 1,
some of the surviving individuals, the younger ones, remain in the same stage while the oldest surviv-
ing individuals move on to the next stage. To model this nonlinear transition, let gi and pi represent,
respectively, the probability of surviving and moving from stage i to i + 1, and the probability of sur-
viving and remaining in stage i. Thus, 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖 represent transition probabilities in our stage-structured
life cycle model.
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3.1 Population equations
In our two species population model, we deﬁne R and F as the number of roe and fallow deer, respec-
tively, in the habitat. The species are grouped into four stages, denoted i, with i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where 1
denotes fawns, 2 denotes juveniles, 3 denotes adults, and 4 denotes senescence, as deﬁned as above.
Each species is further classiﬁed into diﬀerent types: fawns (recruits), c; females, x; and males, y. This
classiﬁcation is denoted by an index j, with j = c, x, y. For ease of computation and analytical tractabil-
ity, fawns are assumed to be gender neutral (Naevdal et al., 2012; Skonhoft et. al, 2013). This implies
that for both species, the category i = 1 is identical with the category j = c, whereas Stages 2 to 4 are
divided into males and females. The number of roe and fallow deer of type j in stage i at time t are then
speciﬁed as 𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
and 𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
,respectively.
We model the decisions and population development on an annual scale. However, within-year
development of populations is assumed to be the following. First, population size is assumed to be
measured in spring just before birth, which occurs in May to June. Mating is assumed to take place in
the summer and early autumn (July to August). The hunting season, that is, the harvest, takes place in
autumn (September to November), while natural mortality mainly occurs during the winter (cf., e.g.,
Naevdal et al., 2012; Olaussen & Skonhoft, 2011; Skonhoft et. al, 2013). The assumed timing over the
year is thus as illustrated in Figure 2.
The harvests of the roe and fallow deer at time t is given asHR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
andHF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
, respectively. It is assumed
that 0 ≤ HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
and 0 ≤ HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
.
We assume that the eﬀect of competition on species populations is channeled through recruitment.
This is motivated by competition aﬀecting the nutritional status of the roe deer (Nichols et al., 2016),
which in turn aﬀects its fecundity, and hence the number of oﬀspring (Gaillard, Festa-Bianchet, Yoccoz,
Loison, & Toigo, 2000; Hewison, 1996). We model recruitment of both species within the framework
of a modiﬁed Ricker (1954) recruitment function. The original version of this recruitment function
takes into account the impact of population density on the number of births for the same species.
We extend this function to allow also for the impact of fallow deer density on roe deer reproduction.
Recruitment of roe deer at a given time t, is then expressed as:
𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
=
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑟
exp
[
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)]
, (1)
where𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
is the number of recruits and𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
is the number of females in stage i at time t. The parameter
𝜅𝑖
𝑟
denotes the fecundity, that is, the number of oﬀspring for female roe deer in stage i in absence of
inter- and intraspeciﬁc competition, and the subscript r indicates the species in question, that is, roe
deer. The parameters 𝛽𝑟 and 𝜇, which are both assumed to be positive, can be interpreted as measures
of the degree of intra- and interspeciﬁc competition, respectively. As roe dear and fallow deer have only
partially overlapping diets, it can be expected that 𝛽𝑟 > 𝜇, cf., for example, Pianka (1974). Equation (1)
implies that fecundity of roe deer decreases with population density of both species. A consequence of
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this assumption is that the eﬀect of competition is delayed. Food scarcity in year t would, in particular,
imply a low nutritional status of roe deer in gestation over the winter period, when food availability
is already limited. This would imply a lower reproduction in the following year t + 1, motivating the
use of the lag-eﬀect terms, 𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1and𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1. As a consequence, a larger harvest of fallow deer implies
increased access to food in winter and spring for roe deer, where females will be in better health status
implying increased reproduction the following spring.2
The juvenile population at time t + 1 is given by the number of fawns that survive after harvest until
the next period plus the number of juveniles that survive and remain in the stage:
𝑅2
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0.5𝑔
1
𝑐,𝑟
(
𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
− HR1
𝑐,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝2
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅2
𝑗,𝑡
− HR2
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦, (2)
where the same sex ratio, 0.5, is assumed for fawns when they enter into the juvenile stages, and with
𝑔1
𝑐,𝑟
denoting the probability of roe fawns surviving and growing into the juvenile stage. Further, the
adult population equation is expressed as
𝑅3
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑔
2
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅2
𝑗,𝑡
− HR2
𝑥,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝3
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅3
𝑗,𝑡
− HR3
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦, (3)
where 𝑔2
𝑗,𝑟
and 𝑝3
𝑗,𝑟
are the probabilities of a roe deer belonging to category j in Stage 2 surviving and
moving to the next stage, and the probability of the roe deer population belonging to category j in Stage
3 surviving and remaining in the same stage, respectively.
Finally, senescent roe deer population is determined by the number of individuals surviving and
moving from Stage 3 to 4 and the number surviving and remaining in Stage 4, as shown in Equation (4).
𝑅4
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅3
𝑗,𝑡
− HR3
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝4
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅4
𝑗,𝑡
− HR4
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦. (4)
Fallow deer is assumed to be aﬀected only by intraspeciﬁc competition, measured by the parameter
𝛽𝑓 , where the subscript f indicates the fallow deer species. Thus, the recruitment function for fallow
deer is expressed as:
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
=
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
, (5)
where 𝜅𝑖
𝑓
is the fecundity rate, that is, the number of oﬀspring, for female fallow deer in stage i. The
remaining fallow deer stock equations, corresponding to Equations (2) to (4), are represented by Equa-
tions (6) to (8), where 𝑔𝑖
𝑗,𝑓
and 𝑝𝑖
𝑗,𝑓
are the corresponding transition probabilities.
𝐹 2
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0.5𝑔
1
𝑐,𝑓
(
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑐,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝2
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 2
𝑗,𝑡
− HF2
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦, (6)
𝐹 3
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑔
2
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 2
𝑗,𝑡
− HF2
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝3
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 3
𝑗,𝑡
− HF3
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦, (7)
𝐹 4
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 3
𝑗,𝑡
− HF3
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝4
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 4
𝑗,𝑡
− HF4
𝑗,𝑡
)
, ∀𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦. (8)
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4 BIOECONOMIC MODEL
We assume that a single decision maker, managing the total hunting ground, aims at maximizing the
joint net present value of the two species. This assumption is motivated by the right to manage and
hunt in Sweden being tied to land ownership rights: any landowner has the exclusive right to hunt
nonprotected species on his or her own land (Sandström, Wennberg-Di Gasper, & Öhman, 2013). Three
types of hunting beneﬁts are considered: meat, recreation, and trophies. We also take into account costs
for supplemental winter feeding. In this section, we ﬁrst present the economic model, followed by the
associated ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs).
4.1 The model
We account for three diﬀerent kinds of hunting beneﬁts: meat, recreation, and trophy values. First, let
𝑞𝑟 and 𝑞𝑓 denote meat price per kg for roe and fallow deer, while 𝑤
𝑖
𝑗
and 𝜓𝑖
𝑗
denote gender- and stage-
speciﬁc slaughter weight of roe and fallow deer, respectively. These parameters are assumed to be ﬁxed
over time and independent of harvest level. This is a simpliﬁcation as population densities and hence
food scarcity, could aﬀect body mass (Hamre, 2003; Tahvonen et al., 2014). However, the simplifying
assumption of constant weight is frequently applied in the ﬁshery (Skonhoft, Vestergaard, & Quaas,
2012; Tahvonen, Quaas, Schmidt, & Voss, 2013) and wildlife (Naevdal et al., 2012; Skonhoft et al.,
2013) literature. Adding to the meat value, is a recreational value per animal shot, m, assumed. We
assume this value to be equal for the two species and across diﬀerent stages and gender. Finally, trophy
hunting beneﬁts can be considerable (Naevdal et al., 2012). Let 𝑧𝑖
𝑟,𝑗
and 𝑧𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑗
denote the trophy prices
for roe and fallow deer, respectively. We assume that prices are constant, implying that the manager
of the hunting ground is a price taker. This is a reasonable assumption for commercial hunting, where
European sellers of hunting experiences advertise their prices on the Internet, and buyers travel abroad
to purchase hunting experiences. Also, the model applies on smaller spatial scale, and we assume that
the manager does not possess market power. The total beneﬁts associated with harvesting of the two
species can then be expressed as:
𝐵𝑡 =
∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑟,𝑗
HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+
∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑗
HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
, (9)
where 𝑞𝑖
𝑟,𝑗
= (𝑞𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚 + 𝑧
𝑖
𝑟,𝑗
) and 𝑞𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑗
= (𝑞𝑓𝜓𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚 + 𝑧
𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑗
) are the beneﬁts per harvested individual
of roe and fallow deer, respectively, in stage i.
The manager further incurs costs for supplemental, artiﬁcial, feeding during the winter season, when
natural food resources are scarce. Artiﬁcial feeding is here deﬁned as food, such as grass silage or
oats, which is provided at regular intervals at artiﬁcially created feeding sites. Here, the fallow deer is
assumed to be the only species that is artiﬁcially fed during the winter. This is motivated as follows:
in southwest Sweden, where these results are applied, fallow deer typically needs artiﬁcial feeding to
survive the winter. During harsh winters, fallow deer spend almost all their time in big groups around
the feeding stations, while the considerably smaller and solitary roe deer have very little access to the
food, cf., for example, Ferretti et al. (2008). Moreover, grass silage, which is the most common winter
feeding, is not preferred by roe deer because it has generally too low quality in relation to its digestive
system (Alm et al., 2001; Chapman & Chapman, 1975; Ferretti et al., 2008). The cost of winter feeding
is speciﬁed as:
𝐶𝑡 =
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑖
𝑗
(
𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
, (10)
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where 𝑑𝑖
𝑗
is the constant marginal cost of feed per fallow deer of type j in stage i. The assumption of
a constant marginal cost of feed is motivated by the manager being a price taker on the market for
silage and oats, where silage and oats are used not only for wildlife but also for domestic livestock. The
constant marginal cost is also related to the assumption of a constant weight per fallow deer of type j
in stage i: if the weight per fallow deer had been assumed variable over time, it might be necessary to
adjust the cost function in Equation (10).
The manager's decision problem then is to maximize the discounted present value of the future
stream of net beneﬁts, Total Net Present Value (TNPV):
Max
𝐻𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
,𝐻𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
TNPV =
𝑇∑
𝑡=1
𝜌𝑡
(
𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
)
, (11)
subject to the population Equations (1) to (8) and harvest restrictions. In Equation (11), 𝜌 = 1∕(1 + 𝛿)
refers to the discount factor, which measures the rate of time preference, with 𝛿 ≥ 0 as the annual
discount rate.
4.2 Optimality conditions
The manager of the two-species ecosystem is assumed to choose levels of harvest of roe and fallow
deer that maximizes Equation (11) subject to Equations (1) to (8) and the lower and upper bounds on
the harvest constraints. Let 𝜆𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
and 𝛾𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
denote the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (1) to (4) and (5)
to (8), respectively. Also, let 𝜛𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
and 𝜃𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
denote the shadow values associated with the upper bounds
on the harvest variable for roe and fallow deer, respectively. The Lagrangian of the above problem can
then be formulated as:
𝐿 =
∑
𝑡=1
𝜌𝑡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑟,𝑗
HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+
∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑗
HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
−
∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑑𝑖
𝑗
(
𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)]
+ 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
[∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
]
+ 𝜌
∑
𝑗
𝜆2
𝑗,𝑡+1
[
0.5𝑔1
𝑐,𝑟
(
𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
− HR1
𝑐,𝑡
)
− 𝑅2
𝑗,𝑡+1
]
+ 𝜌
∑
𝑖>2,𝑗
𝜆𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
[
𝑔𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
− HR𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
−𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
]
+ 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
[∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
]
+ 𝜌
∑
𝑗
𝛾2
𝑗,𝑡+1
[
0.5𝑔1
𝑐,𝑓
(
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
− HF1
𝑐,𝑡
)
− 𝐹 2
𝑗,𝑡+1
]
+ 𝜌
∑
𝑖>2,𝑗
𝛾𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
[
𝑔𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
]
+ 𝜔𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
(
𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝜃𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
(
𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
. (12)
Following the Kuhn–Tucker theorem, we proceed to present the FOCs, which are associated with
the above maximization problem. For brevity, we present only the optimality conditions for the adult
cohorts, see Equations (13) to (17). Also, the FOCs for the diﬀerent stages are qualitatively similar and
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hence carry similar interpretations. The remaining FOCs can be found in Appendix A. Equations (13)
and (14) represent the optimal harvest conditions for adult male and female roe and fallow deer, respec-
tively:
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HR3
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞3
𝑟,𝑗
− 𝜌𝜆3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑟
− 𝜌𝜆4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑟
−𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HR3
𝑗,𝑡
, (13)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HF3
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞3
𝑓 ,𝑗
+ 𝑑3
𝑗
− 𝜌𝛾3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝜌𝛾4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝜃3
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HF3
𝑗,𝑡
. (14)
Equation (13) states that an adult roe deer can be harvested up to the point where the marginal
harvest beneﬁt, 𝑞3
𝑟
, is, at most, equal to the marginal user cost, 𝜌(𝜆3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑟
+ 𝜆4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑟
), where the latter
is determined by the discounted value of the expected reduction of adult and senescence populations
in the following time period. When this condition holds with equality, the harvest is positive. If it
holds with inequality, the harvest is zero since the marginal beneﬁt of harvesting will be less than the
associated marginal user cost. If 𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
> 0, the expression holds with equality and 𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
expresses the
shadow cost of the upper bound on the harvest. The optimal harvesting condition for adult fallow deer,
Equation (14), is analogous to Equation (13) and hence carries a similar interpretation, except for the
inclusion of the marginal cost of winter feeding, 𝑑3
𝑗
. Here, an adult fallow deer is optimally harvested
up to the point where the incremental beneﬁt from one more unit of harvest is, at most, equal to the
marginal user cost, which equals 𝜌𝛾3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑓
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝑑3
𝑗
. Thus, the inclusion of feeding costs
implies that the marginal user cost is lower, reﬂecting the fact that fallow deer that remain unharvested
in the autumn must be fed at a cost over the following winter.
Equation (15) shows the optimal stock condition for adult female roe deer:
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅3
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅3
𝑟
exp
[
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)]
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
× exp
[
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)]
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑥,𝑟
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑥,𝑟
− 𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡
+𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅3
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0.
(15)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the equation is the marginal increase in roe deer recruitment
resulting from holding an additional unit of female adult roe deer. It measures the direct positive value
of holding one more adult female roe deer on the roe deer recruitment. Meanwhile, the second term on
the right-hand side captures the indirect, negative value of holding an additional adult female roe deer,
due to the impact on roe deer recruitment via increased intraspeciﬁc competition. The third and fourth
terms capture, respectively, the value of the expected contributions of an additional female adult roe
deer to female roe deer populations in Stages 3 and 4. The ﬁfth term is the shadow value of holding
an additional female adult roe deer in time t until the following year t + 1. Finally, the additional term
𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
, if positive, expresses the value of relaxing the upper bound on the harvest at time t when the
restriction is binding. Rewriting Equation (15) assuming an interior solution, we obtain Equation (16),
which states that the number of female adult roe deer should be maintained such that their shadow price
is equal to the sum of its discounted net contribution to roe deer recruitment, evaluated at the shadow
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price of fawns, and its discounted contribution to the expected growth of the adult and senescent female
stages, evaluated at their respective discounted shadow prices:
𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅3
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
× exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑥,𝑟
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑥,𝑟
.
(16)
Examining Equation (16) reveals that it is only worthwhile to keep the one more roe deer if the
net value of its contributions to recruitment and population in diﬀerent stages is positive. A higher
intraspeciﬁc competition among roe deer will reduce the net contribution to recruitment, hence reduc-
ing the overall marginal beneﬁt of holding an additional unit of the stock until the following year, and
vice versa. In a similar manner, a higher interspeciﬁc competition from fallow deer will reduce the roe
deer recruitment, and hence reduce the marginal beneﬁt of holding an additional adult female roe deer.
Compared to Equation (16), the corresponding condition for fallow deer, Equation (17), shows how
the presence of interspeciﬁc competition aﬀects the optimal stock of adult female fallow deer:
𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅3
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
+ 𝜌𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑥,𝑓
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑥,𝑓
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝑑3
𝑥
.
(17)
The stock condition in (17) states that the number of adult female fallow deer should be maintained
such that their shadow value, 𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡
, is equal to the sum of the value of its net contribution to fallow deer
recruitment, captured by the two ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side, and the value of its contribution
to the growth of the adult and senescent stage, captured by the third and fourth terms on the right-
hand side, less the value of its indirect eﬀect on roe deer recruitment due to interspeciﬁc competition,
𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1𝑅
𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp[−
∑
𝑖𝑗 (𝛽𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)] = 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇𝑅
1
𝑐,𝑡
, and the cost of winter feeding, 𝑑3
𝑥
.
Thus, an increase in interspeciﬁc competition, 𝜇, reduces the marginal beneﬁt of keeping an additional
adult female fallow deer.
4.3 The marginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer
The term 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇𝑅
1
𝑐,𝑡
appears in a similar manner in all stocks conditions for fallow deer, see the
Appendix, and reﬂects themarginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer reproduction, with consequential
eﬀects on roe deer populations and harvests. If the manager of the habitat is ignorant about interspeciﬁc
competition, that is, believes that 𝜇 = 0, and takes his harvesting decisions accordingly, a unit tax on
fallow deer at time t, set equal to 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇𝑅
1
𝑐,𝑡
for all stages, would lead him to internalize the eﬀects
of interspeciﬁc competition (cf., e.g., Baumol & Oates, 1988), implying that his decisions would be
equal to the one that would be taken if the two-species system was optimally managed.
5 CASE STUDY AND DATA
The model is illustrated numerically using empirical data, mainly obtained from the Koberg estate
in southwest Sweden. The Koberg estate is a private property, covering approximately 90 km2, and
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providing opportunities for commercial hunting of wildlife. Several wildlife species are actively coman-
aged at the estate and in their natural habitat. The totally dominating wildlife species in the habitat is
fallow deer followed by wild boar (Sus scrofa), but smaller populations of roe deer and moose (Alces
alces) also occur, together with even smaller numbers of red deer (Cervus elaphus) and muﬄon sheep
(Ovis aries). The landowner sells hunting permits both for certain occasions, implying hunting over
one or a few days, and for longer periods to individuals and groups. The hunters are then allowed to
hunt in restricted areas of the estate during the hunting season. The choice of the Koberg estate as a
study area is motivated by the availability of high quality data on harvests, populations, and life history
data, which can be used to calibrate our model to an empirically relevant baseline. Similar data, in
particular for populations, are rarely available for large herbivores.
5.1 Data
Fallow deer fecundity and survival data were obtained from a ﬁeld study carried out at the Koberg estate
during 2006 to 2014 (Kjellander, 2014). Roe deer fecundity and survival were based on estimates from
the Bogesund research area in east-central Sweden (Kjellander, 2000). Following Crouse, Crowder,
and Caswell (1987) and Chaloupka (2002), we estimate transition probabilities based on the stage-
speciﬁc survival rates and stage duration, assuming constant survival and growth rates within each
stage. Stage-speciﬁc slaughter weights are a close proxy of the edible meat weight from the two species.
The slaughter weight is assumed to be 70% of dressed weight, based on the examination of 1,183
and 2,712 harvested roe and fallow deer, respectively (Andersson, Glöersen, Brittas, & Huldt, 1996;
Cederlund, Stålfelt, & Kjellander, 1991).
We assume constant inter- and intraspeciﬁc competition across stages and time, but diﬀering
between species. By using reproduction and survival data from the Bogesund research area, where
roe deer has an unharvested carrying capacity of 35 animals/km2, we calibrate the roe deer intraspe-
ciﬁc competition to be consistent with this carrying capacity in the steady state when there is zero
harvests, and only roe deer is present in the habitat. For fallow deer, we use population and harvest
data from the Koberg area, where fallow deer is harvested and yet dominating, and population den-
sity is estimated to 45 fallow deer/km2. We calibrate the fallow deer intraspeciﬁc competition such
that it is consistent (in steady state) with the population density in the Koberg area, while assum-
ing that the fallow deer is optimally harvested and that it is the single species in the habitat. Hav-
ing obtained calibrated intraspeciﬁc competition parameters, we proceed to calibrate the interspecies
competition parameter using the two species population model described in Section 3. To this end,
we used empirical data on populations and harvest of roe and fallow deer from the Koberg estate
over 6 years, in combination with the estimated intraspeciﬁc competition parameters, to calibrate the
interspecies competition parameter to be consistent with these observations.3 These exercises give
an intraspeciﬁc competition for roe and fallow deer, respectively, equal to 0.000421 and 0.000217.
The higher intraspeciﬁc competition for roe deer is a consequence of its lower carrying capacity,
explained by the more selective feeding habits discussed in Section 2. Further, calibration resulted in
an interspeciﬁc competition parameter equal to 0.000114. The lower interspeciﬁc competition, com-
pared to intraspeciﬁc competition, was expected given the partially overlapping diets and habitats.
Having calibrated the inter- and intraspeciﬁc competition parameters, initial total roe and fallow deer
populations were set equal to the steady-state levels in the socially optimal two-species bioeconomic
equilibrium.
Meat and trophy price data as well as data on recreational value were obtained from the Koberg
area. Meat prices are prices paid when hunters choose to buy the meat after participating in a hunt. The
recreational value of hunting is calculated as the average net revenue per animal shot during arranged
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hunts.4 Trophy values are determined by their size and quality, graded in three classes (bronze, silver,
and gold medal). We use the weighted average of trophy prizes as trophy values in the model. We
assign trophy values to only the adult roe deer males and senescent fallow deer males, since these
trophies are the most valuable to hunters due to their large size and high quality. The supplemental
winter feeding costs was estimated for each fallow deer stage, using the total feeding cost and adjusting
for metabolic body weight in each stage using the approach of Putman (1980). It should be noted that
the fact that all economic data have been obtained from the Koberg area implies that hunting values are
high compared to those for the typical Swedish hunter as the commercial hunting sector is a subsector
in the higher end of the market. The reference scenario assumes a 3% discount rate as recommended
in cost–beneﬁt analysis of public projects, see Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, and Weimer (2011). All
parameter values are shown in Table 1.
6 RESULTS
Results are computedwith a numerical programmingmodel using the CONOPT3 solver and theGAMS
software (Brooke, Kendrick, & Meeraus, 1988). For the empirical analysis, we make use of three diﬀer-
ent scenarios, chosen to illustrate the role of interspeciﬁc competition. The ﬁrst scenario, OPTIMAL,
assumes that the manager is aware of interspeciﬁc competition eﬀects. Decisions are thus identical with
the problem described in Section 3. The second scenario, NOCOMP, illustrates the outcome that would
result if there was no interspeciﬁc competition, 𝜇 = 0. This implies that the carrying capacity of the
habitat would be larger, as more deer would be sustained in the biological equilibrium. We also include
a third scenario, IGNOR, where we assume that the manager is not aware of interspeciﬁc competition.
In this case, we simulate the system forward in time. As the manager incorrectly anticipates the future
at time t, he has to adapt his harvesting strategy every time step to the new conditions, that is, the stock
sizes in t + 1, which are diﬀerent than anticipated due to the species interactions. To determine the
time path of harvests and stocks over 70 years, the optimization is done 70 times in a rolling horizon
fashion: For every next time step, a new initial state is computed (using the correct population model)
from the previous period's initial state, and the harvest rates are determined by the imperfectly planning
manager. For all scenarios the dynamic model solves the problem over a 120-year period. A relatively
long time period is necessary to avoid end-of-time eﬀects, for example, in the IGNOR scenario 50
future time periods remain at t = 70.
All scenarios are computed for two data sets, which diﬀer with respect to the harvesting beneﬁts
included. The ﬁrst data set includes all harvesting beneﬁts: meat, trophy, and recreation values. The
second data set includes only recreation values. The motivation for using only recreation values in
some of the calculations is the following: fallow deer has multiple advantages for the manager: high
population densities are possible, each individual provides more meat than roe deer of the same age and
sex, and trophy values are higher. This suggests that the manager may prioritize fallow deer before roe
deer under the reference set of parameters. The use of recreation beneﬁts, equal for both species and all
stages, illustrates how interspeciﬁc competition aﬀects optimal joint management under less extreme
conditions. Inclusion of these calculations increases the possibilities to draw more general conclusions
from the results.
We use our scenarios to investigate, ﬁrst, the implications of interspeciﬁc competition for the eco-
nomically optimal harvesting of the two species, and the consequential eﬀects for deer populations.
This is followed by an investigation of the value of the marginal damage of fallow deer, in terms of its
impact on roe deer reproduction and hence populations and harvests. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is
conducted to assess eﬀects of assumptions about the discount rate.
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TABLE 1 Parameter values. Methods are described in the text
Stage
Parameter 1 2 3 4
𝜅𝑖
𝑟
Fecundity rate for female roe deera 0 1.23 1.83 1.58
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
Fecundity rate for female fallow deera 0 0.89 0.96 0.76
𝑔𝑖
𝑥,𝑟
Probability of female roe surviving and moving from stage i to i + 1b 0.72 0.391 0.170 0.111
𝑔𝑖
𝑦,𝑟
Probability of a male roe surviving and moving from stage i to i + 1b 0.85 0.301 0.160 0.103
𝑔𝑖
𝑥,𝑓
Probability of a female fallow surviving and moving from stage i to i + 1b 0.857 0.472 0.092 0.092
𝑔𝑖
𝑦,𝑓
Probability of a male fallow surviving and moving from stage i to i + 1b 0.759 0.50 0.305 0.023
𝑝𝑖
𝑥,𝑟
Probability of a female roe surviving and staying in stage ib 0 0.459 0.775 0.629
𝑝𝑖
𝑦,𝑟
Probability of a male roe surviving and staying in stage ib 0 0.419 0.770 0.617
𝑝𝑖
𝑥,𝑓
Probability of a female fallow surviving and staying in stage ib 0 0.491 0.871 0.871
𝑝𝑖
𝑦,𝑓
Probability of a male fallow surviving and staying in stage ib 0 0.50 0.421 0.703
𝑤𝑖
𝑥
Meat weight of female roe deer, kg/animal a 7.6 7.6 12.1 12.1
𝑤𝑖
𝑦
Meat weight of male roe deer, kg/animal a 7.6 7.6 12.1 12.1
𝜓𝑖
𝑥
Meat weight of female fallow deer, kg/animal a 13.2 21.6 26 26
𝜓𝑖
𝑦
Meat weight of male fallow deer, kg/animal a 13.2 28.5 49.7 49.7
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,0 Initial roe female population at t = 0
c 397 264 458 78
𝑅𝑖
𝑦,0 Initial roe male population at t = 0
c 331 100 0
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,0 Initial fallow female population at t = 0
c 1108 950 448 0
𝐹 𝑖
𝑦,0 Initial fallow male population at t = 0
c 841 726 222
𝛽𝑟 Intraspeciﬁc competition, roe deer
d 0.000421
𝛽𝑓 Intraspeciﬁc competition, fallow deer
d 0.000217
𝜇 Interspeciﬁc competitiond 0.000114
𝑑𝑖
𝑥
Winter feeding cost female fallow deer, SEKe 49.4 71.6 82.3 82.3
𝑑𝑖
𝑦
Winter feeding cost male fallow deer, SEKe 51.6 88.2 134.7 134.7
𝑧𝑖
𝑟,𝑦
Trophy price for roe deer, SEKe NA NA 6,000 NA
𝑧𝑖
𝑓 ,𝑦
Trophy price for fallow deer, SEKe NA NA NA 18,580
𝑞𝑖
𝑟
Meat price roe deer, SEK/kge 65
𝑞𝑖
𝑟
Meat price fallow deer, SEK/kge 65
M Recreational value, SEK/animale 3,167
𝛿 Discount rate, %f 3
aKjellander (2000).
bAuthors’ calculation, based on Kjellander (2000, 2014).
cSet to steady-state level. For fawns, the ﬁgure refers to the total number for both sexes.
dCalibrated.
eStudy area. Exchange rate: 1 EUR = 9.47 SEK (average for 2016).
fBoardman et al. (2011).
6.1 Optimal harvesting strategies
The OPTIMAL scenario generates a uniform5 harvesting regime for fallow and roe deer with the ref-
erence set of parameters (Table 1). Pulse harvesting is found in several cases when the interspeciﬁc
competition parameter or the discount rate is altered (Table B1). In scenarios where pulse harvests
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occur, they disappear if the eﬀect of inter- and intraspeciﬁc competition is, instead, assumed to occur
without a time lag. This conﬁrms the observation in Naevdal et al. (2012) that pulse harvest tends to
occur when there is a time lagged eﬀect on recruitment. The likely reason for the occurrence of pulse
harvesting is the beneﬁcial eﬀect on recruitment in the following year.
In Table 2, we present the harvesting strategies in terms of the average annual outcomes. When all
harvesting beneﬁts are included, the OPTIMAL and IGNOR scenarios yield identical outcomes for
all variables. This shows that knowledge about the interspeciﬁc competition does not imply that the
manager reduces the fallow deer population in order to beneﬁt the roe deer population and harvest. The
reason is that the cost for reducing the fallow deer population, in terms of fallow deer harvests fore-
gone, exceeds the beneﬁts in terms of a higher roe deer population and hence higher roe deer harvest.
The NOCOMP scenario yields the same fallow deer management as the two other scenarios, further
conﬁrming that fallow deer harvesting is unaﬀected by the presence of interspeciﬁc competition. Roe
deer population density and harvest are, respectively, 42% and 87% higher under NOCOMP compared
to the other scenarios, and the net present value is 10% higher.
When all harvesting beneﬁts are included, female fallow deer are harvested in Stage 3, while female
roe deer are harvested in Stage 4, which might be explained by the larger fall in reproduction between
Stages 3 and 4 for fallow deer. Male fallow and roe deer are harvested in Stages 4 and 3, respectively,
when the trophy value is the highest.
In contrast, simulations with only recreation beneﬁts lead to a solution where the fallow deer popula-
tion is adjusted when the manager is aware of interspeciﬁc competition. Here, the OPTIMAL scenario
implies a reduction of fallow deer population density and harvest by 7% and 2%, respectively, com-
pared to the NOCOMP scenario, that is, fallow deer populations are adjusted downward in the presence
of interspeciﬁc competition. Under the IGNOR scenario, the fallow deer population is equally high as
under NOCOMP, hence ignoring the adverse impact on roe deer. This has consequences for roe deer,
implying a 9% larger population size but 3% lower harvest compared to the OPTIMAL scenario. Con-
sequently, fallow deer revenues increase, and roe deer revenues decrease compared to the OPTIMAL
scenario. In spite of the strategy under the IGNOR scenario being suboptimal, the average annual net
revenues in steady state (in current value) are equal to those under the OPTIMAL strategy. However,
the net present value in the OPTIMAL scenario exceeds the one in the IGNOR scenario by 0.4%. This
is explained by the OPTIMAL scenario generating pulse harvests, whereas only minor traces of pulse
harvests are found under the IGNOR scenario. The pulses under OPTIMAL are associated with varia-
tions in net revenues, where periods with high net revenues are skewed toward the early time periods.
Simulations with only recreation beneﬁts imply that younger individuals of both species are har-
vested in the OPTIMAL scenario, as there is no reason to postpone harvesting in order to obtain higher
meat and trophy values. This does not apply to the IGNOR scenario, where the manager fails to account
for beneﬁcial eﬀects of fawn harvesting on roe deer reproduction, leading to declining reproduction,
and a large share of mature female roe deer, and a smaller share of fawns, compared to the OPTIMAL
scenario.
The lack of adjustment of fallow deer harvesting in the presence of interspeciﬁc competition dis-
cussed above raises the question of how the magnitude of interspeciﬁc competition aﬀects the existence
of a bioeconomic equilibrium, where both species are present in positive numbers. Figure 3 shows the
development of fallow and roe populations under diﬀerent assumptions about the size of 𝜇. The simu-
lations show that if 𝜇 is increased by a factor 3 or more, compared to our calibrated data, an equilibrium
with both species present does not exist in our model.
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F IGURE 3 Development of deer population sizes for diﬀerent assumptions about interspeciﬁc competition in the
OPTIMAL scenario with all harvesting beneﬁts included. “Fallow deer, all 𝜇” indicate the fallow deer population size
under 𝜇 = 0.000114, 0.000228, 0.000342, and 0.000456
F IGURE 4 Marginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer calculated from theOPTIMAL scenario with all harvesting
beneﬁts included. Exchange rate: 1 EUR = 9.47 SEK (average for 2016)
6.2 The marginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer
The marginal damage of fallow deer on roe deer is calculated according to the deﬁnition in Section 4.3.
Figure 4 shows the development of the marginal damage for diﬀerent assumptions about interspeciﬁc
competition when all harvesting beneﬁts are included in the calculations. Using the reference set of
data the marginal damage equals 177 SEK per fallow deer, and is constant over time, given the steady
state with uniform harvests. A doubling of 𝜇 leads to a higher marginal damage for all time periods.
If 𝜇 is increased by a factor 3, the marginal damage is ﬁrst higher, but over time roe deer population
size and reproduction falls, implying a decreasing marginal damage. When 𝜇 is increased by a factor
4, roe deer reproduction immediately falls, the marginal damage then declines toward zero as the roe
deer get extinct. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when only recreation beneﬁts are included,
although the marginal damage level is lower due to the smaller harvesting beneﬁts of roe deer.
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TABLE 3 Steady-state marginal damage of fallow deer, populations, harvests, and annual revenues under diﬀerent
discount rates. Results from OPTIMAL scenario with all harvest beneﬁts included
Population Harvest
Discount Rate (%)
Marginal Damage of Fallow
Deer on Roe Deer (SEK)a Roe Fallow Roe Fallow
0 216 1,697 4,058 185 633
3 177 1,697 4,058 185 633
6 151 1,697 4,058 185 633
9 139 1,458 4,058 193 633
12 127 1,212 4,058 189 840
15 118 1,034 3,809 185 1,182
aExchange rate: 1 EUR = 9.47 SEK (average for 2016).
6.3 Implications of the choice of discount rate
A high discount rate implies that current consumption is valued relatively higher than future consump-
tion. This reﬂects a high degree of impatience, and tends to imply larger harvest in early time periods,
but can also imply a smaller population size and harvest in the long run (Tahvonen et al., 2014).
The calculations shows that steady states with positive population sizes for both deer species are
obtained for all discount rates between 0 and 15 (Table 3). Results are not aﬀected by a change in the
discount rate for discount rates between 0 and 6, except the marginal damage of fallow deer, which falls
with increases in the discount rate due to the lower value associated with the impact on future outcomes.
When the discount rate is further increased, the harvest composition changes toward the less valuable
gender and younger life stages, and harvested numbers tend to increase. Roe deer populations decline
for discount rates 9% and higher, and fallow deer populations when then discount rate is increased to
15%. The low impact of the discount rate on the steady-state outcome is consistent with observations
in Tahvonen et al. (2013) and Naevdal et al. (2012).
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The main goal of this paper is to analyze, and demonstrate empirically, the role of competition between
two sympatric deer species for the optimal management and to identify whether eﬃcient policy instru-
ments could be applied when such competition is unknown to hunting managers. To this end, we
develop a stage-structured numerical bioeconomic model of roe and fallow deer in the presence of
interspeciﬁc competition.
The theoretical analysis shows that if fallow deer exerts a negative, unilateral impact on roe deer,
this implies a lower value of holding additional fallow deer, which can be a motive for reducing the
population density of fallow deer. The marginal damage of fallow deer, in terms of the impact on the roe
deer population size and harvest at equilibrium, depends on the magnitude of interspeciﬁc competition
between species and the size of the two populations.
The model is simulated using empirical data on species’ life history characteristics, three types
of hunting beneﬁts, and costs for winter feeding of fallow deer. Results suggest that ignorance of
interspeciﬁc competition does not aﬀect fallow deer holdings compared to a situation where the man-
ager is aware of such competition. This contrasts with expectations, but is explained by the economic
advantages of fallow deer to the manager, compared to roe deer. If, instead, economic beneﬁts of har-
vesting are assumed equal for the two species, the model shows the intuitively expected outcome where
18 of 24 ELOFSSON ET AL.Natural Resource Modeling
the optimal solution implies that the fallow deer population is adjusted downward in order to reduce
the negative impact on the roe deer.
The above suggests that the existence of interspeciﬁc competition can be a problem with respect to
the possibilities to sustain viable roe deer populations, independently of whether the manager is aware
of interspeciﬁc competition or not. Our estimate of the magnitude of interspeciﬁc competition is based
on scarce data, and if the parameter level is increased by a factor 3 ormore, the optimal solution does not
include roe deer in the bioeconomic equilibrium. This suggest that further research on the magnitude of
interspeciﬁc competition is valuable if, for example, roe deer generate signiﬁcant ecosystem services.
Results indicate that the introduction of a tax on fallow deer, set equal to the marginal damage on roe
deer, would not improve on the outcome in a situation where the manager is ignorant about interspeciﬁc
competition because of the larger hunting beneﬁts from fallow deer. If, instead, harvesting beneﬁts were
equal for the two species, the introduction of a tax would increase roe deer harvests, but the net eﬀect
on the manager's revenues would still be insigniﬁcant. Also, absence of a tax has no obvious negative
eﬀects on roe deer population numbers, and the share of mature females increases, which is typically
seen as positive for the viability.
Pulse harvesting is common in age- and stage-structured models (Clark, 1990; Clark, Edwards,
& Friedlaender, 1973; Hannesson, 1975; Tahvonen et al., 2013; Walters, 1969). Earlier studies have
shown that pulse harvests can be generated by the choice of discount rate (Clark et al., 1973; Tahvonen
et al., 2013), imperfect selectivity (Tahvonen, 2009), the shape of the objective function (Tahvonen
et al., 2013), and the size of the hunting recreation value (Skonhoft et al., 2013). Our results indi-
cate the level of interspeciﬁc competition, and the existence of the time-lag on inter- and intraspeciﬁc
competition, are additional factors that can explain the occurrence of pulse harvests.
A restraint of this study is that neither aesthetic nor existence values of the species are accounted for.
The same holds for the costs of browsing damages on agricultural crops and on trees in commercial
forest stands. Moreover, interspeciﬁc competition could have an eﬀect through alternative channels,
such as reproduction, survival, and individual growth (Elofsson & Gren, 2015; Hamre, 2003), and our
choice of modeling these eﬀects is a simpliﬁcation. These limitations should be borne in mind when
interpreting the results.
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ENDNOTE
1 Exchange rate: 1 EUR = 9.47 SEK (average for 2016).
2 Harvest continues throughout the winter implying that in practice, the population equals the number in population count
in the spring in year t in the beginning of the hunting season in year t and approaches the population count in year t +
1 in the end of the same season. Therefore, reproduction functions with and without a time lag could both be plausible.
Our choice to use a time lag is determined by the data: the population data from the study site indicate that a high fallow
deer population density in the spring in a given year is negatively correlated with roe deer population density in the
following year. The relationship between species densities in the same year is more ambiguous.
3 This is done by minimizing the square of the diﬀerence between a slack variable and the interspeciﬁc competition
parameter.
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4 Hunting fees are paid in advance, as a lump sum, hence it is not possible to calculate diﬀerent recreational values for
the species.
5 Also referred to as continuous, smooth, or stationary harvesting.
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APPENDIX A
Optimality conditions
The Kuhn–Tucker FOCs for the above optimization problem, including the slack conditions are:
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HR1
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= 𝑞1
𝑟,𝑗
− 0.5𝜌
(∑
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(A2)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HR3
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞3
𝑟,𝑗
− 𝜌𝜆3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑟
− 𝜌𝜆4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑟
−𝜛3
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HR3
𝑗,𝑡
;
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦;
(A3)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HR4
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞4
𝑟,𝑗
− 𝜌𝜆4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑗,𝑟
−𝜛4
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HR4
𝑗,𝑡
;
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦;
(A4)
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𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HF1
𝑐,𝑡
= 𝑞1
𝑓 ,𝑗
+ 𝑑1
𝑗
− 0.5𝜌
(∑
𝑗=1
𝛾2
𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝑔1
𝑐,𝑓
− 𝜃1
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HF1
𝑐,𝑡
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ;
(A5)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HF2
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞2
𝑓 ,𝑗
+ 𝑑2
𝑗
− 𝜌𝛾3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
2
𝑗,𝑓
−𝜛2
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HF2
𝑗,𝑡
;
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦;
(A6)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HF3
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞3
𝑓,𝑗
+ 𝑑2
𝑗
− 𝜌𝛾3
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝜌𝛾4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝜃3
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HF3
𝑗,𝑡
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦;
(A7)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
HF4
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑞4
𝑓,𝑗
+ 𝑑4
𝑗
− 𝜌𝛾4
𝑗,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑗,𝑓
− 𝜃4
𝑗,𝑡
≤ 0; 0 ≤ HF4
𝑗,𝑡
;
𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑥, 𝑦;
(A8)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
+ 0.5𝜌
(∑
𝑗
𝜆2
𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝑔1
𝑐,𝑟
+𝜛1
𝑐,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅1
𝑗,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A9)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅2
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅2
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜆2
𝑥,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
2
𝑥,𝑟
+𝜛2
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅21,𝑡 ≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A10)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅2
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜆2
𝑦,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑔
2
𝑦,𝑟
+𝜛2
𝑦,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅2
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A11)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅3
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅3
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
3
1,𝑟 − 𝜆
3
𝑥,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑥,𝑟
+𝜛3
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅3
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A12)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅3
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝜌𝜆3
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑦,𝑟
− 𝜆3
𝑦,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑦,𝑟
+𝜛3
𝑦,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅2
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A13)
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𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅4
𝑥,𝑡
= 𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅4
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
))
− 𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
1>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑥,𝑟
− 𝜆4
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅3
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A14)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝑅4
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑟
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝜌𝜆4
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑦,𝑟
− 𝜆4
𝑦,𝑡
+𝜛4
𝑦,𝑡
≤ 0;𝑅4
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A15)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝑑1
𝑐
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
+ 0.5𝜌
(∑
𝑗=𝑥
𝛾2
𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝑔10,𝑓 + 𝜃
1
𝑐,𝑡
≤ 0;
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A16)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 2
𝑥,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅2
𝑓
× exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝛾2
𝑥,𝑡
− 𝑑2
𝑥
+ 𝜌𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
2
𝑥,𝑓
+ 𝜃1
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝐹 2
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A17)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 2
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑓
− 𝛾2
𝑦,𝑡
− 𝑑2
𝑦
+ 𝜌𝛾3
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑔
2
𝑦,𝑓
+ 𝜃2
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝐹 2
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A18)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 3
𝑥,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅3
𝑓
× exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡
− 𝑑3
𝑥
+ 𝜌𝛾3
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑥,𝑓
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑥,𝑓
+ 𝜃3
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0;𝐹 3
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A19)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 3
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝛾3
𝑦,𝑡
− 𝑑3
𝑦
+ 𝜌𝛾3
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑝
3
𝑦,𝑓
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑔
3
𝑦,𝑓
+ 𝜃3
𝑦,𝑡
≤ 0;𝐹 3
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A20)
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𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 4
𝑥,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
+ 𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
𝜅4
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝛾4
𝑥,𝑡
− 𝑑4
𝑥
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑥,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑥,𝑓
+ 𝜃4
𝑥,𝑡
≤ 0
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 4
𝑥,𝑡
𝐹 4
𝑥,𝑡
= 0;𝐹 4
𝑥,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… .., 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A21)
𝜌−𝑡𝐿′
𝐹 4
𝑦,𝑡
= −𝜌𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝜇
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡+1𝜅
𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
− 𝜌𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡+1𝛽𝑓
∑
𝑖>1
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝛾4
𝑦,𝑡
− 𝑑4
𝑦
+ 𝜌𝛾4
𝑦,𝑡+1𝑝
4
𝑦,𝑓
+ 𝜃4
𝑦,𝑡
≤ 0;
𝐹 4
𝑦,𝑡
≥ 0; 𝑡 = 0, 1,… , 𝑇 ; 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑦,
(A22)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝜆1
𝑐,𝑡
=
∑
𝑖>1
𝑅𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑟
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
(
𝛽𝑟𝑅
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
))
−𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
= 0, (A23)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝜌𝜆2
𝑗,𝑡+1
= 0.5𝑔1
𝑐,𝑟
(
𝑅1
𝑐,𝑡
− HR1
𝑐,𝑡
)
−𝑅2
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0, (A24)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝜌𝜆𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
= 𝑔𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
− HR𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗,𝑟
(
𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HR𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝑅𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 ∀𝑖 > 2, (A25)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝛾1
𝑐,𝑡
=
∑
𝑖
𝐹 𝑖
𝑥,𝑡
𝜅𝑖
𝑓
exp
(
−
∑
𝑖𝑗
𝛽𝑓𝐹
𝑖
𝑗,𝑡−1
)
− 𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
= 0, (A26)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝜌𝛾2
𝑗,𝑡+1
= 0.5𝑔1
𝑐,𝑓
(
𝐹 1
𝑐,𝑡
− HF1
𝑐,𝑡
)
− 𝐹 2
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0, (A27)
𝜌𝑡𝐿′
𝜌𝛾𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1
= 𝑔𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑡
)
+ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗,𝑓
(
𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
− HF𝑖
𝑗,𝑡
)
− 𝐹 𝑖
𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 ∀𝑖 > 2. (A28)
APPENDIX B
TABLE B1 Harvest variation in OPTIMAL scenario in steady state with all harvest beneﬁts included
Data Compared to Reference Set of Parameters in Table 1 Fallow Deer Roe Deer
Reference set of parameters 633 185
𝜇 = 0 633 206–891
𝜇 = 0, no time lag for interspeciﬁc competition 633 354
𝜇 = 0.000228 638 43–116
𝜇 = 0.000228, no time lag for interspeciﬁc competition 633 66
Discount rate 9% 633 146–317
Discount rate 9%, no time lag for interspeciﬁc competition 633 191
